Regulation's theory of consumption has been a significant but rather "hidden" item behind the Fordist/post-Fordist labor process connotations. Its main argument is that working-class consumption was capitalistically commodified only after World War II. Thus, there was no mass consumption to cover the capitalist mass production established in the 1920s. The basis of the post-World War II boom was the creation of a social consumption norm (via wages indexation to productivity) that ensured unfettered capitalist accumulation. This schema is both analytically and empirically invalid.
Introduction
The regulation approach was pioneered in France in the 1970s by political economists (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1985; Boyer 1990; etc.) attempting to explain the long-term dynamics of change and stability of capitalism. It had a considerable international impact until the 1980s when its influence receded. However, it continues to command considerable influence in certain areas of radical political economy. What is even more important is that terms that have been coined by regulation 1 (Fordism and post-Fordism being the more popular) have acquired a life of their own and are being employed by many other approaches and in quite different scientific fields than those of strict economics. Thus, the popular Fordism/post-Fordism duo is being used in multidisciplinary and sociological fields (such as consumption theory) and in philosophical endeavors (usually those associated with postmodernist views). In almost all these areas, Fordism is linked to consumer society, that is, the notion that in the middle of the twentieth century, society's attitude toward individual, private consumption changed in favor of consumerism. Similarly, post-Fordism is related to a saturation of mass markets and a turn toward specialized market niches.
This article critically analyzes regulation's consumption theory, which, despite being one of its fundamental areas, is usually neglected. Because the concept of Fordism gestated from the labor process debates, it is usually forgotten that in strict regulationist terms, it denotes the coupling of mass production with mass consumption and that the second is a sine qua non element with particular aspects of its own. Regulation's treatment of consumption centers on working-class consumption, its changes, and its overall macroeconomic impacts. It adopts an argument that was popular in the 1960s and 1970s and continues to be today, particularly in consumer studies; there was a structural change after World War II that transformed workers to mass consumers, and this provided the necessary market outlet that secured capitalism's postwar "golden age." Then the 1973 crisis is explained as the outcome of, among others, a saturation of the mass market and the emergence of a differentiation process in consumer tastes that leads toward small, specialized markets. The popularity of this argument transcends the limits of economics and spills over to a number of other areas, particularly in cultural studies and sociological analyses. Thus, modern theories of space and ideological trends, analyses of food systems and consumption patterns, to list only a few, hinge on this very elegant scenario.
This study questions the analytical and empirical validity of the regulationist scenario. First, its underlying empirical beliefs are being contested. It is argued that workers' consumption constituted a mass market for capitalist products long before the supposed Fordist era. It is shown that it is not necessary to have a mass production system in advance to have mass consumption. Furthermore, contrary to regulationist assertions, mass production and the real subjugation of labor to capital was not a particular characteristic of the early twentieth century but was established earlier. Therefore, the crisis of 1929 was not a crisis of underconsumption, and the major problem was not the lack of mass consumption in order to realize mass production. Second, it is shown that the regulationist analytical framework is problematic. Its theory of wage determination is deemed as theoretically and empirically unsound, since it adopts a questionable institutionalist and politicist perspective. In addition, it is argued that this perspective is analytically and empirically inferior to the Marxian theory of the value of labor power. Furthermore, regulation's notions of the regime of accumulation (RoA) and of the mode of regulation (MoR) have limited explanatory power and cannot grasp properly either the coordination of production with demand or the socioeconomic functions that support the former. Particularly, the attempt to analyze capitalism's historical dynamics from within the contours of a reproduction scheme, as regulationists and especially Aglietta (1979) do, is erroneous and does not accord either with Marx's intention for his reproduction schemes or with capitalism's actual workings. Reproduction schemes focus by definition on the coordination of supply and demand and the achievement of equilibrium and abstract from other crucial aspects of capitalism. In this context, it is argued that Aglietta's (1979) hypothesis of a certain primacy of the capital goods department over the wage goods one (the "motive impulses thesis") is arbitrary and unwarranted.
This critique has a number of crucial inferences. First, regulation's periodization of capitalism, which depends crucially on the functional linkage of production and consumption, is argued to be unsound. Second, it is shown that regulation's theory of consumption is instrumental for its trajectory toward postmodernism and the related abandonment of class analysis.
The article is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents an outline of regulation and a brief critique of its methodological and analytical foundations. Section 3 analyzes the regulation theory of consumption (in part 1) and its underlying stylized facts and theoretical influences (in part 2). Section 4 considers the analytical and empirical issues involved and it is subdivided in three parts. Part 1 criticizes regulation's views on the commodification of working-class consumption. Part 2 extends this criticism to the regulationist theory of wage and particularly Aglietta's version. Finally, part 3 discusses critically Aglietta's reproduction model and his "motive impulses" thesis, since these represent the more coherent expositions of the analytical framework underpinning regulation's fundamental concepts and its subsequent theory of consumption. The last section contains the concluding comments.
Regulation Theory: A Summary Outline and a General Critique
The regulation approach proposed an institutionalist and historicist theory of capitalism based on two key concepts: the regime of accumulation (RoA) and the mode of regulation (MoR). The RoA represents the form of distribution of surplus between capital and labor required in each period to coordinate production with social demand. It covers the essential economic conditions for the operation of the productive system (technology, organization of the labor process, relations between the departments of production). The MoR designates the necessary institutional forms and social compromises for the reproduction of the RoA. The RoA is posited at the level of the compulsory economic structures, whereas the MoR is less determinate, since it relies on concrete, historically specific institutional forms. More than one MoR can be implemented in a certain RoA. Which will prevail is a question open to the indeterminacy of history. However, not every MoR is suitable for every RoA.
Two historical types of RoA are usually considered. In extensive accumulation, preexisting production processes were incorporated into a capitalist framework without major changes. The traditional way of life, as expressed in patterns of consumption, was not radically recomposed. The combined development of the two departments of production was achieved with difficulty, and the pace of accumulation encountered recurrent obstacles. In intensive accumulation, production was reorganized radically on capitalist lines. A new mode of life for the working class was created by establishing a logic that operates on the totality of time and space in daily life. Consequently, a social consumption norm was formed that no longer depended on communal life but was stratified according to the divisions of social groups within the working class. The two departments of production were integrated and, hence, the pace of accumulation was more regular.
In addition, two MoR are recognized. In the competitive MoR, which is considered more appropriate to extensive accumulation, there was a posteriori adjustment of the output of the various branches to price movements, which were highly responsive to changes in demand; wages were adjusted to price movements so that real wages were either stable or rose slowly. In the monopolist MoR, income distribution is socialized via a series of compromises between capital and labor (wage formation in relation to inflation and productivity). Market relations (pure pricing adjustment mechanisms) play only a minor role in adjusting social demand and production. This role is exercised mainly by a complex set of institutions, conventions, and rules that constantly aim at developing effective demand at the rate of production capacities.
On the basis of the historically contingent correspondence between RoA and MoR, regulation periodizes capitalism as follows:
1. From the mid-nineteenth century until World War I, extensive accumulation accompanied by competitive regulation predominated. 2. The period between the two World Wars was an unstable transitional phase characterized by the emergence of intensive accumulation (mass production or Taylorism) but without mass consumption. The 1929 crisis, perceived as an underconsumptionist cum institutionalist crisis, marks this period. 3. After World War II, intensive accumulation is coupled with mass consumption and monopolistic regulation. This is the era of the Fordist RoA, in which working-class consumption has been commodified and provides the needed mass market for capitalist mass production. 4. The Fordist RoA enters a crisis in the 1970s and post-Fordism is proposed as its successor. Emphasis is being put on the new information and communication technologies, small-scale production processes, the relaxation of standardized production tasks, the significance of the service sector, new life styles as stimulants of consumption, and so forth. However, the definition and the characteristics of this new configuration are far from clear. Mavroudeas (1999b) has argued that regulation belongs to a new breed of middle-range (m-r) theories (e.g., social structures of accumulation, flexible specialization), which have a number of crucial common characteristics: historicism, institutionalism, a trajectory from a mild structuralism to an equally mild poststructuralism and postmodernist influences, a gradual distancing from Marxism, and so on. These theories were branded as nonorthodox m-r theories, and it was shown that they have an unstable formalistic theoretical content and a problematic gearing to historical reality. M-r theories, in contrast to grand theories (covering the whole spectrum, from the most abstract laws and concepts to the empirical analysis of the concrete, in a unified framework), reject abstract general laws and the necessity of an all-embracing theory, which are deemed to be either redundant or a distant accessory. They substitute both with intermediate concepts with an immediate identification with the most concrete phenomena. These intermediate concepts are not linked to a general theory but have a pretheoretical character, which rejects the process of dialectical abstraction. Instead, they are based on empirical observations perceived as indisputable (stylized facts). The stylized facts represent an eclecticist reading of historical reality, underpinned by a hidden theoretical framework. They enable the creation of a theory, which is based on the intermediate concepts and a periodization theory. Consequently, these concepts and periodization vindicate, in a circular way, the initiating empirical perceptions. The major weapon, but also the great deficiency, of the m-r theories is their close identification with a particular historical epoch, on the basis of which they derive their intermediate concepts and around which they organize their field of research. This gives them immense popularity during the course of the particular epoch but, on the other hand, invalidates them when it ends. Then, more fundamental questions reemerge, requiring a grand theory. In this case, m-r theory's agnosticism and/or referential pluralism become a major weakness.
Regulation's stylized facts are derived from the interwar period and the post-World War II epoch. The latter is the main benchmark, whereas the first is treated as a transitional era. Then, other periods are theorized neither on their own nor via a general theory but according to the principles set in, and by comparison with, the benchmark period (see Mavroudeas 1999b; Dumenil and Levy 1988: 2-4; Brenner and Glick 1991) .
Regulation's m-r perspective takes theoretical flesh by recourse to historicism and institutionalism. Historicism is the necessary counterpart of m-r theory. Institutionalism, on the other hand, was adopted because of its wide popularity during regulation's period of birth. On the epistemological level, regulation started with a relaxation of the structuralist conceptions but soon moved toward the emerging fashion of poststructuralism and postmodernism. Changes of this type are a typical symptom of m-r theories and their lack of a grand theoretical referential framework, which is covered by conforming to the occasionally predominant theoretical trend.
In Mavroudeas (1999b) , it was also shown that regulation passed through three major periods. The first is marked by Aglietta's (1979) path-breaking work. Marxism was accepted as the grand theory, and regulation aspired to provide a methodological formulation and a historical interpretation of the latter appropriate for modern times. However, the m-r perspective was already lurking underneath, in the articulation of a quasi-empiricist methodology with the stylized facts. In the second period, the contradiction with the grand theory emerged and the latter fell away, while regulation assumed an explicitly m-r character. The last period is characterized by regulation's crisis of identity. The alleged end of Fordism brought forward grand theoretical questions, which regulation was unable to answer. As a response, it attempted to reconstruct a new quasi-grand theory, differentiated by both neoclassicism and Marxism, based on some theorization of the societalization process and the structure-subject relation. Marxist class analysis was, implicitly or explicitly, rejected, and individuals and "horizontal" contradictions crept in. Poststructuralism and postmodernism provided the vehicle for this move, which, however, failed, leading to the present withering away of regulation.
Consuming Regulation: Theory, Influences, and Stylized Facts

Regulation's theory of consumption
The significance of consumption remained hidden during regulation's first steps and emerged only in its latest phase. However, the very definition of the RoA reveals that the concern of regulation's fundamental concepts is the linkage between production and consumption. Equally, the MoR covers mainly institutional forms of income distribution and norms of consumption.
Regulation's consumption theory hinges on a simple and elegant idea. In pre-Fordist stages, workers integrated into the capitalist system through production, whereas their con-sumption remained noncapitalist. Absolute surplus value predominated, the value of labor power was determined individually and competitively (on the basis of the bundle of subsistence goods), and production was socialized (relations between capitals) only through the market, with a minimal state presence. Capitalists and the middle strata were the buyers of capitalist commodities. There was no need for a regulation of social (extraproduction) reproduction (through a standardization of consumption patterns), since capitalists and those "third persons" managed their consumption according to capitalist norms. However, workers' struggles and intracapitalist competition constrained the extraction of abstract surplus value and led to the predominance of relative surplus value through the adoption of Taylorist mass production of standardized commodities. This mass of standardized capitalist commodities required a mass market, since capitalist and third-person consumption did not suffice. Thus, the traditional way of living of the working class was destroyed, and labor power became reproduced through mass consumption of capitalist commodities.
These changes affected radically the role and the process of wage formation. In pre-Fordist stages, labor power was a commodity whose value was determined competitively on the market, according to the value of the subsistence bundle that was not made up of capitalist commodities. Wage was the price of this value, determined according to the classical Marxian principles. Wage reductions had no negative effects, since they increased profits, and the subsequent loss in outlets affected only the independent producers and, through them, the rentiers. On the contrary, in Fordism, wages are not just a cost but also an outlet for capitalist production. In addition, labor-power ceases to be a commodity (or becomes an extremely suis generis one) and its "value" is no longer determined according to class struggle in production (on the division of labor time) but according to (1) struggles in income distribution and (2) the management of the effective demand for capitalist mass production. At the same time, working-class consumption is turned toward capitalist commodities. Therefore, wages are not formed on the basis of the value-price transformation but according to extraproduction considerations and struggles that lead to institutionalized compromises with only a weak linkage with production via the indexation of wages to productivity gains. The socialization of capitalist production is effected not through the classical market mechanism but through collective supervisory agencies and institutions. These agencies take into account both the general capitalist interests and working-class pressure and formulate historically contingent compromises that sustain the reproduction of capitalism.
Thus, economic reproduction is supposed to depend crucially on social reproduction. Institutions take their revenge over production and markets. However, since capitalism is a system of supposedly free individuals, not only production and income distribution but also consumption has to be organized functionally. Hence, it is necessary to create standardized social consumption patterns that would guide individual choices. Aglietta's (1979) concept of the norm of consumption, derived from a reproduction model, represents the most articulate version of this thesis. The rest of the regulationists simply kept his conclusions and neglected the reproduction model and its theoretical and empirical assumptions. Aglietta argued that the motive impulses for the transformation of the forces of production derive from Dept.I (means of production). There is, therefore, a tendency for the two departments to develop unevenly as a result of the internal accumulation of Dept.I, which is inscribed into the structure of social capital via the increase in the organic composition of capital (OCC). However, because relative surplus value is extracted through a reduction in the time needed to reconstitute social labor power, it can be produced only by transforming the conditions of production of the commodities produced in Dept.II. This requires that Dept.II must be able to absorb the commodities produced in Dept.I and incorporate them as constant capital in those production processes that lower the value of means of consumption. If this condition is not met, then the uneven development of Dept.II exercises a depressing influence on the accumulation of capital. It is only by revolutionizing the conditions of existence of the wage-earning class that this barrier, which is always latent, can be raised and, hence, a harmonious development of the two departments can be achieved, at least tendentially. This requires both a domination of commodity goods over noncommodity goods in wage earners' consumption and the mass production of these commodities to lower their value and hence to lower the cost of reproduction of labor power. The growing social demand for consumer goods, previously considered as luxuries, ensures that these can now be profitably produced by capitalists and therefore move from sub-Dept.IIa (luxuries) to Dept.II as a whole. Then technological progress can now be fully deployed, and productivity increases in Dept.I find their outlets in the expansion of Dept.II. These unhindered productivity increases in Dept.II lower the unit value of its products, thereby increasing the production of relative surplus value. The increase of the latter permits rises of the real wage. This organic linkage of the two departments is achieved only in the intensive RoA, where commodity circulation is organized according to a general pattern: a social norm of wage earners consumption is created. Three processes were considered instrumental for its creation:
1. The socialization of finance, through social insurance funds, secured against the temporary loss of direct wages and enabled wage earners to purchase goods whose exchange value was relatively large. 2. Collective bargaining led to a homogenization and socialization of wages that had no longer a one-to-one relation to the personal productivity of a worker. This divorce of wage adjustment from the business cycle made capital's expanded reproduction less sensitive to instabilities of the exchange equivalence relations resulting from transformations of production conditions. Thus, wages in Fordism were supposed to be linked to aggregate labor productivity. This established a constancy of the nominal reference wage (defined as the ratio of total wages to total abstract labor), which is the keystone of the creation of a norm of consumption dominated by the mass production of commodities and which prevents a cumulative shortfall in effective demand when the conditions for producing surplus value deteriorate (Aglietta 1979: 181) . 3. The development of heavy industry led to the destruction of traditional ways of life (from the end of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth). Taylorism, and later Fordism, adapted to the restriction of the working day by sharply increasing the intensity of labor and systematically compressing wasted time. Consequently, any time available for recuperation at the workplace itself disappeared, and a strict separation between working and nonworking hours was imposed. Aglietta (1979) argued, assuming as evident, that individual commodity consumption was the only form that permitted the most effective recuperation in a compact space of time within the day and at a single place, the home. Henceforth, individual ownership of commodities governed the concrete practices of consumption of the wage-earning class.
Based on this analysis, Aglietta (1979) seeks to theorize consumption as a socially conditioned activity, subject to conflicting forces of homogenization and differentiation that modify it in a manner favorable to the generalization of wage labor. Since consumption is a predominantly private process (not directly under the sway of the relations of production), "status" relations or "social relations of an ideological nature" are crucial (Aglietta 1979: 157) . In fact, he is proposing some kind of "relative autonomy" of the consumption sphere, but not the absolute autonomy or even hegemony proposed by the theories of consumer society. This relative autonomy permits cultural and ideological factors to play a decisive role in determining the norm of consumption but also to segment the wage-earning class (although this is not yet a primary factor of segmentation).
To support these theses, regulation resorts to certain high-profile and popular examples. Aglietta (1979) maintained that standardized housing (as the privileged site of individual consumption) and the automobile (as the means of transport compatible with the separation of home and workplace) were instrumental for the construction of the Fordist consumption norm during the crucial period of the 1920s. Boyer and Durand (1997: 69-71) argued that two fundamental technologies underlay the Fordist coupling of mass production and mass consumption: the automobile (it structured space by promoting individualism and private home ownership and enabling suburban expansion and even second homes) and electricity (it revolutionized production and gave rise to a multitude of mass consumption products). Esser and Hirsch (1989: 421-23 ) add the electronics industries to housing and automobiles. However, they recognize that Fordist urbanization resulted in a contradictory social homogenization and individualization. Florida and Feldman (1988: 187-78 ) add consumer durables, but they accept that although housing was crucial for U.S. Fordism, it was the result of unique historical conditions (and that other capitalist countries, with different constellations of political and economic forces, followed alternative ways) and that important segments of the working class (nonunionized "periphery" workers and minorities) were systematically excluded.
All regulationists accept all these arguments. However, Aglietta in later works moved even further, advancing a new theory significantly different from the initial one, while the rest of regulation did not follow him. What is interesting is the underlying continuity between fundamental theses of his early theory, which, however, remained veiled, and their later emergence. Consumption played again a crucial role in his new endeavors. Aglietta and Brender (1984: 9-10) conceived capitalism not in the classical Marxist manner but following the Annales school. Capital is identified with money and is conceived as a mode of communication between the most diverse modes of production. Value and labor time are absent, there is an indiscriminate equation of precapitalist and capitalist forms of capital, and money becomes the center of gravity of the whole theory. Aglietta and Brender (1984: 10-13) distinguished three epochs or societies: the society of the "ancien regime," the bourgeois society, and the wage society. The latter is marked by the socialization of the ways of producing and living. Social demand is marked by the behaviors of the wage earners. Social distinctions and differences do exist, but these are much more fluid. Social classification is in a process of continuous transformation. Hence, classes are substituted by social groups, a much more fluid and malleable concept. The proletariat is dissolved in the mass of the wage earners, something already pronounced in the Theory of Capitalist Regulation, but this time, even the latter have ceased to constitute a class, and they represent a vast mass subject to internal differentiations. The wage society is a mass society and not a class society (Aglietta and Brender 1984: 18) and consumption becomes a crucial mechanism of social differentiation.
Two points should be raised here. First, the distinction between wage earners and non-wage earners is based on forms of receiving income rather than on relations in production. Wage earners are different from workers and wage labor in the Marxian sense. The rejection of a value theoretic framework and its substitution with the methodological individualism of the Girardian theory 2 of routines and behaviors provide the basis of this reasoning. Second, Aglietta and Brender (1984) advance a methodologically individualist theory of consumption and social differentiation (based on distinctions in consumption behavior). Wage society is composed of a mass of individuals receiving incomes in the form of wages and subdivided according to income differences ("the more or less in the homogeneity of wage earners") and status relations. Income differences constrain the usage of things, whereas status denotes their semiological signs. Therefore, consumption is in perpetual diversification because the ruling classes attempt to prevent the trivialization of objects, to emit signs, and to invent distinctions in the usage, in pursuit of a variety of instituting social differences (Aglietta and Brender 1984: 97-98) . Thus, struggles of classification develop in consumption. Their objects are the signs of a code of consumption (the interplay between distinction and imitation, etc.).
3 In this approach, habits, norms, projects, and strategies of not very clearly defined agents are the pivot of the evolution of production and social classification. Moreover, these vague and ill-defined groups are not the primary factor but rather the effect: they achieve their fleeting existence because individuals choose to constitute them.
Regulation, Keynesianism, the Rostow thesis, and postmodernism
Regulation's consumption theory is based on certain stylized facts that are supposed to be indisputable and theory free. However, this is not the case. Regulation borrowed several of its crucial stylized facts, in its first stage, from Keynesianism and Rostow's theory of the mass consumption society and, in its later stage, from postmodernism. In the first stage, it inherited the conception of the 1929 crisis as a crisis of underconsumption from Keynesianism and the coming of mass consumption after the 1920s from Rostow. The coupling of these influences establishes regulation's initiating dichotomy of capitalism (pre-Fordism, Fordism) . Although rejecting the theory of these approaches, regulation implicitly accepts much of their empirical beliefs and, as a consequence, of their theoretical agenda. In regulation's later stage, the notion that in post-Fordism, demand becomes frag-mented and market niches are created according to tastes, status, and semiological signs is taken from postmodernism. Both the theoretical and the empirical validity of these hypotheses are questionable.
Theories of the affluent mass consumption society were flourishing before and during the first steps of regulation. They advanced, in praise or criticism, an image of a working class overfed by consumer goods and incorporated in capitalism through Keynesian policies of demand management and social-democratic class accords. Moreover, they argued that workers matter now equally as individual consumers and as the labor force. Most of these theories built on Rostow's (1967) thesis of the mass consumption society. Their usual argument was that a structural change in consumer tastes took place in the 1920s that led toward consumer durable goods. This process was supported by the expansion of credit mechanisms and was prominently reflected in the sales of automobiles, housing, and electrical appliances. Regulation has a striking affinity with those theories and particularly with their radical versions. Westley and Westley (1971: 16, 80) proposed that these changes were based on suburbanization and the creation of the "private" family and that they led to the appearance of the figure of the affluent worker and the construction of a standard consumption norm. In these versions, the working class becomes the central figure of the mass consumption society, while at the same time it becomes incorporated into a previously hostile system. Regulation's similarity with these views extends also to other aspects such as the implementation of a noneconomistic multicausal framework (Rostow 1967 ) or wage's linkage to productivity (Westley & Westley 1971: 43) .
The Keynesian inspirations derive from the theory of effective demand and the explanation of the Great Depression. Behind Aglietta's formulation about the need for a comprehensive linkage between the two departments of production and the absence of any automatic mechanism to balance their development lays the belief that the growth of the market provides both the driving force and the constraint to accumulation. Thus, in the case of twentieth-century capitalism, this lack of sufficient demand is surpassed with the passage from extensive accumulation to Fordism. In addition, it leads to a prioritization of the realization problem, blended with a specific theory of disproportionality, over the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as the cause of crisis. The result is a theory of crisis and, more specifically, an explanation of the crisis of the 1930s, with Keynesian connotations. It is not a Keynesian theory per se in the sense of the theories of insufficient aggregate demand. Notwithstanding, as Dumenil and Levy (1993: 237) accurately argued, it belongs to that breed of theories of underconsumption/overproduction of which Baran and Sweezy (1966) are a characteristic example. The shared backbone of these theories is that they blend Keynesian elements into a Marxist framework, producing a problematic explanation of the Great Depression based on some notion of secular underconsumption (inadequacy of demand for the output of Dept.II) in the 1920s.
In its initial phase, regulation attempted to accommodate all these intuitions within a Marxist framework. The result was a highly eclecticist theory. This was underpinned with the relative autonomization of consumption from production, which had a lot in common with radical versions of the mass consumption society and an increasing volume of sociological theories (see McCracken 1987) . During its subsequent period, its m-r nature enabled regulation to preserve its unity by retaining the conclusions and the intermediate elements and by undermining the theory of the consumption norm. When this period ended and its present crisis erupted, ambiguous and diverse tendencies emerged, a typical example of which is Aglietta's latest theory of routines and the absolute autonomization of consumption.
In this later stage, and in its attempt to explain the collapse of Fordism, regulation borrows its new stylized facts from postmodernism. The first step is the dethronement of the Fordist superficial primacy of the production process and its substitution by a primacy (?) of the consumption sphere. Lipietz (1986) admitted that most approaches to post-Fordism emphasize the demand side and particularly the differentiation of consumption patterns. 4 Thus, the simplistic primacy of (mass) production of Fordism is easily, and equally superficially, reverted, and a demand-side explanation is offered instead. The theory that is derived from these new stylized facts carries also heavy postmodernist influences. Postmodernism has proved a fertile terrain on which to displace previous materialist preoccupations rooted in production and to embrace individualism. In the Marxist tradition, consumer culture and generally private, domestic, and cultural reproduction are intimately tied to the reproduction of capitalist economic and political relations. Postmodernism (and post-Fordism, particularly in the way it is being employed in consumer culture studies) inverts these lines of thought, giving to culture a centrality within both private and public reproduction. There is more than a simple affinity between regulationist theories of societalization (e.g., Aglietta's theory of routines) and postmodernist approaches (e.g., Baudrillard 1983; Jameson 1985) . Both streams, in the name of a social perspective as opposed to crude economism, dissolve classes and reduce social collectivities to mere fleeting creatures. Discursive elements, such as status, predominate. In the end, the equation is obvious: socialization equals individualization. Routines, norms, and signs based on more or less culturalist foundations become the major determinants. Their consumption theories play a crucial role in this perspective.
An interesting precursor of both postmodern and late regulationist consumption theory can be found in the so-called use-value or culturalist theories of consumption exemplified by Baudrillard (1981) , 5 which argued that Marx, by prioritizing production, neglected use-value and hence the social determination of what is to be produced and what is to be consumed and by whom. Therefore, they placed their emphasis on the form of value and especially in the social construction of use-value. As Fine and Leopold (1993: 267-73 ) have shown, this resulted in a failure. On one hand, this emphasis on the form of value was at the expense of its quantitative, dynamic, and historical dimensions and substituted the qualitative for the quantitative. Consequently, these theories failed to confront capitalist commodity production and to distinguish between productive and final consumption. On the other hand, they inverted Marx's logic. Instead of the combination of use-value and exchange-value to determine productive forces, class, and power, it is vice versa. As a result, class and power become external referents by which is explained the pattern of uniformity and distinction in consumption. This inversion is based on a more general inversion of Marx's logic: commodity and money become the central categories.
All these theoretical elements reappear in postmodernist and late regulationist theories of consumption, but this time "liberated" from the burden of value theory.
Regulation's Consumption Theory: More Heat than Light
When and how was working-class consumption commodified?
Regulation's distinct Marxist flavor, which distinguishes it from most of the postmodernist approaches, is given by the assumption that working-class consumption is perceived as noncapitalist before Fordism. It is with Fordism that capitalist commodities conquer working-class consumption. This is a significant argument needing more qualifications. Commodification in general is not identical with capitalist commodification. This distinction is treated casually by many regulationists and sympathizers, such as De Vroey (1984) . He argued that workers' consumption during the regime of extensive accumulation was characterized by (1) the dominance of noncommodity relations over commodity relations, (2) the reproduction of labor power mainly through domestic activities, (3) wages being only complementary to this reproduction, and (4) the greater amount of the commodities purchased being noncapitalist. This is a strong version. Lipietz (1984a: 96) adopts a weaker one, stating that during extensive accumulation, wage laborers had "practically no access to capitalist products." In the strong version, the distinction between commodities in general and capitalist commodities is not important, since it is held that working-class consumption as a whole lay primarily outside the sphere of commodification, otherwise composed mainly of noncapitalist commodities. That leaves domestic production, petty commodity production, and agriculture as the possible providers of the workers' means of subsistence. On the other hand, the weak version sidesteps the question of the extent of commodification of workingclass consumption and asserts only that the latter did not include capitalist products. In this case, the distinction between capitalist and noncapitalist commodities is crucial, because it may be accepted that workers' consumption was commodified but the goods that entered it were noncapitalist commodities.
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The strong version has insurmountable problems when it confronts historical reality. Commodification was an early comer as far as working-class consumption is concerned; much more so with regard to wage earners, since they include also other social strata apart from the proletariat, and the purchasing power of many of these was greater than the latter's. The separation of producers from their means of production cannot but result in their not being able to produce the greater amount of their means of subsistence. During the early phases of capitalism, the bigger part of all their major needs (food, clothing, housing, etc.) had to be bought. This was supplemented by their own production, or rather the domestic production of their family, since it was impossible, especially considering the long working hours of that period and the worse working conditions, for the working members of the family to work extensively and regularly in domestic production. Another significant factor, quite important in many newly industrialized countries, could be the support of the extended family, who were peasants. Their support was usually in the form of either agricultural products or money. However, all these contributions had a complementary and irregular character, and the worker had still to buy most of his means of subsistence. De Vroey's (1984) assertions to the contrary, and especially for such a prolonged period up to World War I, fly in the face of historical reality. Commodity relations became dominant in workers' consumption almost with the birth of capitalism.
The weak version proposes a more ingenious but equally problematic position. Workers' consumption may have come under the dominance of commodity relations, but these were mainly noncapitalist until the 1920s; true capitalist relations emerged only after World War II. This version is also erroneous because it cannot comprehend 1. how capitalism can assimilate functionally elements of precapitalist systems without allowing them even remnants of an independent autonomous existence but also without being hampered by them, 2. that mass markets can exist without the concentration and centralization of retailing, and 3. that mass consumption can exist prior to mass production.
First, regulation has a simplistic understanding of capitalist commodification, derived from their conception of a specific society as the sum total of different modes of production, one of which assumes hegemony over the others and provides the unifying framework. This is an assumption inherited from Althusserianism. An extreme example of this conception is represented by Aglietta and Brender's (1984: 9-10 ) theory of capital as a mode of social communication and cohesion between different modes of production. Regulation follows the Althusserian view of a pure mode of production, which does not exist actually but is simply a mental construction (e.g., Lipietz 1985: 19) . The only real existing objects are specific (historically concrete) economies that consist of a multiplicity of modes of production. Within this multiplicity, one mode of production is dominant and exerts its hegemony over the others. However, the rest retain their relative autonomy and ought to be studied as separate entities. This Althusserian and regulationist perspective cannot conceive of the mode of production as an actually existing state of affairs and demotes it to a simple ideal-type concept. Consequently, it cannot explain how elements and remnants of previous modes of production can be completely integrated into the capitalist mode of production and, despite retaining their formal characteristics, become integral operational parts of it. In this rather usual case, the functions of those remnants of older modes of production alter radically and cannot be analyzed as separate, relatively autonomous entities. Regulation's much-acclaimed example of petty commodity production is characteristic. Capitalism has assimilated elements of simple commodity production, such as craftsmen and family works, and has benefited from certain of their aspects as they provided at the same time a market for capitalist products as well as cheap complementary products and services. Many petty commodity producers' means of production were capitalist products, and many of the services they provided were serving as side products and complementary aspects of capitalist production (an obvious example being cloth repairs by tailors). This close interweaving between activities that do not employ directly wage labor and pure capitalist activities can be extremely functional for capitalism as a whole. Regulation's neat dichotomy of these two types of activity (and, furthermore, the thesis that the first can act as a fetter for the second) flies in the face of historical evidence (see Brenner and Glick 1991: 70-71) .
A typical case in which these regulationist shortcomings are evident is agriculture. It provided much of the urban population's means of subsistence, and capitalist concentration and centralization in many countries took place quite late. In other cases, the majority of the agricultural sector was, until lately and often is still, comprised of small farmers. Despite that, it has become capitalist and has ceased to represent small commodity production, since it was not surplus products that were exchanged nor was the main bulk of production for self-subsistence. Production for exchange had become the norm, and the agricultural sector represented both a market for capitalist commodities (such as machines, certain materials, and fertilizers) and a provider of means of trade (as traders and merchants were the main retailing outlet of agricultural products). Regulationist endeavors in this area are extremely formalistic and weak and prove the weaknesses of their theoretical and empirical categories. The invasion of capitalist relations in agriculture is usually related to the appearance of Fordist forms, that is, after World War II. In this way, the role of agricultural products, and particularly food products, in the reproduction of labor power can fit with the weak regulationist version, that is, that working-class consumption was covered by capitalist commodities only with the advent of Fordism. Brenner and Glick (1991: 70-71 ) offered an excellent refutation of the exemplary case of the regulationist scenario: U.S. agriculture. They pointed out that U.S. economic growth in the period 1850-1914 was based on the revolutionization of an agricultural sector, which, although not formally capitalist, supported functionally capitalist accumulation and was an integral part of it. Owner-operator family farmers, who were not peasants, retained a certain control over their labor process but produced for the market and were market dependent for their subsistence. As Brenner and Glick justifiably pinpoint, this "makes a mockery of the Regulationists' idea that in their first period of development in the United States workers derived their subsistence from outside the sphere of capitalist commodity production" (70).
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The second regulationist misconception is expressed in their implicit identification of capitalist domination of the circulation of consumer commodities and retailing with the emergence of multiple shops and department stores. This misconception is based on a confusion between capitalist dominance in this area and capitalist concentration and centralization. Of course, the latter, when it appears, is an undeniable proof of the former. However, this does not mean that the first did not exist in advance. As Fraser (1981) showed, until the 7. The rest of the regulationist analysis of the agricultural and agro-food sector is equally problematic. Goodman and Watts (1994: 37) accurately pointed out that changes in agro-food systems are considered as mere mirror images of the supposed Fordist and post-Fordist industrial restructurings. This formalistic treatment loses significant aspects of the evolution of agriculture and the agro-food systems. The usual scenario is the following. Alleged U.S. Fordist agriculture is considered as the model that the rest of the world more or less followed. Then changes are classified according to the Fordist/post-Fordist straightjackets. Thus, for McMichael (1994) , the wheat complex is attached to national regulation, the durable food complex (sugar and oils) to agro-industrialization, and the livestock complex to globalization. Despite the ingenuity of this classificatory framework, the regulationist obsession with specific sectors and cases (e.g., automobiles in the case of Fordist industry) disregards other crucial aspects of reality. As Fine, Heasman, and Wright (1996: 52) pointed out, this classificatory formalism leaves out other important foods that do not belong to these complexes and cannot even account for the evolution of these very complexes in the supposed eras of transition from one regulation to the other. Moreover, it cannot account for the large number of nonfood agricultural products (e.g., cotton, flax, tobacco, indigo, hemp) that were produced, from the very beginning of capitalism, for the market. 1860s, the general store (small corner shop) was the center of the provision of almost all the necessities of the workers. The goods sold were mainly cheap, mass-produced capitalist products. In the United Kingdom, a radical change in retailing took place between 1850 and 1914, with the appearance of multiple shops (chains), specialist retailers, and all-embracing department stores and the progressive elimination of the small shop and the street hawker. Multiple shops started to appear in the 1870s and were aiming at a working-class clientele. The 1850s saw the emergence of department stores. This change signified the arrival of capitalist concentration and centralization. However, its effective dominance was established long before, and the small shop provided the vehicle for it.
The third regulationist misconception is perhaps the more crucial. Regulationists assume that Fordist mass production must come before mass consumption. This is a neat and almost algebraic logical formulation. Notwithstanding, there is no reason whatsoever why mass consumption must follow mass production, let alone Fordist mass production. Mass consumption can exist without mass production, with standardized products being sourced from a fragmented industrial sector and supplying a widely dispersed market. 8 This indeed was the case during the first steps of the Industrial Revolution. This does not imply (as a historical stream argues for the Industrial Revolution, e.g., McKendric, Brewer, and Plumb 1982) that consumption can be put on an equal par with production but that the specific regulationist historical account is simplistic and problematic.
There are two interrelated historical issues regarding this subject: first, when capitalist mass production was established, and second, when the first capitalist mass consumption was created and whether the working class participated in it and to what extent.
Regulation locates mass production in the transitional period of the beginning of the twentieth century. However, more authoritative and cautious accounts (see Brenner and Glick 1991) propose an earlier date. Regulation ignores systematically the role and the features of the Industrial Revolution, which amounted to the establishment of the factory system. Contrary to regulationist analyses (which suppose that Taylorism constituted a radical break in capitalism's ability to innovate and control the labor process), new machinery and production systems had been more or less regularly introduced before. After all, it is unrealistic to suppose that capitalism for such a long period (from its emergence until Fordism) extracted basically absolute surplus value and refrained from introducing technical and organizational cost-cutting innovations. Marx's analysis of the "machinofacture" is a well-known and fairly accurate exposition of such processes during the very first steps of capitalism.
9 Again, in the case of the regulationist exemplary case of the United States, Brenner and Glick (1991: 70-75) proved that capitalist mass production was established by the Civil War, if not earlier. Thus, transformations of production methods in strategic sectors (such as metal industry, textiles, food processing, means of transport, agriculture) took place earlier than their regulationist arrival in the 1920s.
Regarding mass consumption, there is an enlightening contemporary debate on the origins of the so-called consumer society. Contrary to popular associations of consumer society with the American dream (e.g., Ewen 1976), the origins of consumerism are being located much earlier (and closer to the birth of capitalism) and in other countries before the United States. For example, Mukerji (1983) and Thirsk (1978) mention sixteenth-century England; Weatherhill (1988) , the seventeenth century; McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb (1982) , the eighteenth century; Fraser (1981) , the nineteenth century; Scharria (1987) , eighteenth-century Holland; and Williams (1982) , nineteenth-century France. Even in the case of consumer durables, which may provide a last-ditch defense for the regulationist argument organized around the notion of a consumer durables revolution, a mass market was created before the 1920s. Vatter (1967: 9) , disputing the Rostow thesis, showed that in the United States, this was established in a twenty-five-year period in the nineteenth century (1844-53 and 1869-78).
One stream of this debate (e.g., McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb 1983) considers this genesis of consumerism as a middle-class phenomenon. But there is also a strong case for popular and working-class consumerism (Thirsk 1990; Lemire 1990 ). Food and clothing, two major items of workers' subsistence that are usually downgraded by regulation, give classical examples of working-class participation in capitalist mass markets. For example, in the 1850s and 1860s, there existed already a mass market for working-class, ready-made clothing by shop tailors. Then, from 1860s onward, its mass production began. In the case of food, Brenner and Glick (1991) have shown that the American working class acquired its food from capitalist markets. Of course, the same is almost obvious in the case of Britain, where agriculture was one of the first sectors conquered by capitalist relations. Housing also is not so malleable an example as regulation believes. Working-class housing was commodified even from the beginning of capitalism (see Pugh 1980) . Often, especially in provincial areas, it was part and parcel with the job (e.g., the British mining communities): the company provided accommodation, usually at high rents. It was, therefore, directly part of the wage contract. It was also standardized, especially in the cities where the slums predominated. In addition, the expansion of home ownership and owner-occupier tenure after the 1950s does not represent a qualitative change in the sense implied by the regulationists (i.e., that it transformed a previously noncapitalist commodity into a capitalist commodity). On the contrary, the expansion of individual home ownership limited, to a certain extent, the field of operation of land-owning capital since the individual home-owning sector (contrary to rented accommodation) is not directly engaged in the housing market. Last but not least, the regulationist emphasis on state intervention in housing in the United States after the stock market crash or even after World War II is highly exaggerated. As Florida and Feldman (1988) admit, direct housing provision was rather limited, and state intervention was mainly confined to financial and credit schemes.
In a nutshell, workers' mass consumption is a necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism, not because it represents a market outlet (as underconsumptionists and regulationists tend to argue) but because otherwise wage labor cannot be imposed. Workers must not be able to sustain themselves on their own. Thus, they would be obliged to sell their labor power in exchange for wages with which they could purchase their means of subsistence. This leads to the creation of a mass market for basic means of subsistence. It has to be a mass market because these are a rather small number of basic low-quality goods. In addition, they have to be relatively cheap so as not to raise the value of labor power. As argued above, this was the actual historical course. From the Industrial Revolution, the products of many key sectors entered directly into working-class consumption. Many of the first capitalist industries were producing cheap goods for working-class consumption.
Finally, the regulationist argument has certain other minor problems. First, capitalism's erosion of the family economic structure has been disputed (see Fine and Leopold 1993: 40-41) because the productive superiority of the capitalist factory coexists with a countertendency to the erosion of domestic labor: mass production at ever cheaper prices of items that serve as raw materials and machinery of domestic production. For example, the mass production of food ingredients, cooking equipment, and textiles enhances the viability of domestic production. In addition, convenience foods, microwaves, and videos have promoted partly commodified but also domestic food and leisure activities.
Second, regulation usually assumes that a crucial mechanism for the creation of the social consumption norm was an emulation process whereby workers imitated the habits of upper classes. Through this trickle-down effect, it is implied that there will be no cessation of demand for particular goods until the lower class has the same possessions as the higher. On the other hand, because the higher class will constantly be seeking new items to mark its social status, perpetual demand for new products is inevitable. However, Fine and Leopold (1993) have criticized this argument because there is also evidence of "trickle-up" and because it assumes that all classes share the same hierarchical evaluation of goods.
Was an institutionally secured wage necessary for mass consumption?
For regulation, the 1920s were plagued by a deficiency of workers' consumption. This was surpassed with the creation of the social consumption norm by Fordism. This was supposed to secure wage indexation to productivity and a smooth process of capital accumulation (since demand could be co-coordinated functionally with supply). Behind this empirical belief lies a theory of wage determination, which is radically different from those of classical political economy and Marx.
The Marxian approach maintained that wage is the money price of the value of labor power. The latter represents the socially necessary labor time that is expended for the production of a basket of consumption goods that is purchased by the workers. For Marx, the value of the suis generis commodity labor power is expressed in its money price (wage) through the mediation of a set of use values (the bundle of wage goods). This approach has significant merits.
10 First, it can grasp properly the asymmetrical leverages of the working class and the capitalist class. The latter has a direct picture of value relations whereas the former has only an indirect one (which is crucially mediated by use values). Second, it can consequently explain the structural advantages enjoyed by capitalists over workers in the capitalist free-exchange economy. Third, it can grasp the primacy of class struggle in production over conditions of work and its unity with class struggle in distribution, contrary to wage-share approaches that focus only on the latter. Thus, for Marx, it is necessary labor time (mediated by the bundle of wage goods) that operates as the pivot for the wage fund and hence the extent of workers' consumption. Therefore, the determination of the value of labor power is similar to that of all other commodities. However, labor power is a commod-ity different from all the others since it exists only as a capacity of the living individual and is inseparable from its bearer. In this sense, the value of labor power is determined by the value of the necessary means of subsistence for the maintenance of the worker as worker. This introduces a dynamic element that distinguishes the reproduction of labor power from that of other commodities. The value of labor power consists of two parts (see Marx 1968: 222 and 1982: 275) : (1) a physical part, covering the "natural needs" (food, clothing, fuel, housing, etc.), and, (2) a historical and social part, reflecting the level of civilization attained by a country and in particular the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has been formed.
On the other hand, Marx's wage theory does not identify simplistically necessary labor time with wage. The physical element sets only the minimum limit. The value of labor power and the wage can increase, but there is an upper limit given by the rate of profit. As Rosdolsky (1977) pointed out, labour is subject to the economic power of capital in capitalism from the outset, and its "share" must naturally always be conditional on the "share" of capital. Therefore the real uppermost limit of wages is given by the size of profit, and, more precisely, by the movements of the rate of profit. (284) Regulation follows a different and problematic route. The Marxian wage determination is accepted only for the pre-Fordist periods. Strangely, however, the linkage of the value of labor power with the wage, through the mediation of the basket of wage goods, is accepted only when these goods are not either commodities or capitalist commodities. If regulation were more careful, it would recognize that this poses significant problems in its superficial adherence to Marxian theory for the pre-Fordist periods. On the other hand, in the case of Fordism, the Marxian approach is discarded. As soon as working-class consumption is supposed to be commodified (capitalistically), the linkage between socially necessary labor time and wage is broken. Wage is supposed to be simply an amount of money (the wage share) gained through class struggle in distribution. Its only relation to production is because it is assumed that class struggle in distribution is primarily about the sharing of productivity increases. Not only this, but it is argued that capitalism as a whole (capital in general, surpassing the myopic interests of individual capitalists) promotes this sharing because it secures equilibrium relations between Dept.I and Dept.II and the smooth advance of capital accumulation.
This indexing of wages to productivity (which is the basis for the construction and the success of Fordism) depends crucially on institutional arrangements (collective bargaining, state's role in wage negotiations, and the construction of the necessary supportive financial instruments). In this process, institutional, ideological, and cultural elements are deemed equally (if not more) important than economic relations. The classical Marxian approach prioritizes correctly the production (and economic) sphere and then, at a lower level of abstraction, adds political, ideological, and cultural relations. For regulation, this is not so. Its first version (the consumption norm theory, as we will term Aglietta's first theory) reflects a transitional stage. It was not an openly cultural theory, but it had one foot in value theory and the other in a disguised culturalism. It is ironic that behind the rigid Althusserian terminology (structures, agents as their supports, etc.) used in that work lay the elements that generated and enabled the passage to postmodernist culturalism. What the consumption norm theory argues for is a semidetachment (or an "autonomization relatively") of consumption from production. The basis of this attempt is to be found in two essential elements of his approach: the prioritization of status relations (or social relations of ideological nature) over economic relations and the consequent implicit rejection of Marx's wage theory.
Aglietta, implicitly, substitutes Marx's wage theory with one very similar to Carey (1835): In Fordism, wages are supposed to be linked to labor productivity. For Aglietta, this is not a standard characteristic of capitalism (as Carey argued) but rather the outcome of a historical process that took place after World War II. The basis for this awkward marriage between Marx and Carey is based on Aglietta's misconception of relative surplus value. For him, there is neither a diminishing rate of growth of relative surplus value nor periods of rest during which there is not a qualitative change in the productive forces but merely a quantitative extension of the existing technical basis. However, as Marx correctly argued, the extraction of relative surplus value is bounded by the limits of the relation between necessary and surplus labor:
1. the increase in the productive force of living labor diminishes necessary labor; 2. the surplus value increases at a lesser rate than that of the increase of the productive force (i.e., it increases by the surplus of the fraction of the living workday that originally represents necessary labor, in excess over this same fraction divided by the multiplier of the productive force); and 3. the larger the surplus value of capital before the increase of productive force, the smaller the part of the working day that represents necessary labor and hence the smaller is the increase in surplus value that capital obtains from the increase of productive force.
Moreover, Marx (1982: 705) accurately pointed out that the increasing productivity of labor is accompanied by a cheapening of the worker (i.e., a higher rate of surplus value), even when real wages do rise, because the latter never rise in proportion to labor productivity. Hence, "if this were to be the rule, the rate of surplus-value could never rise-and hence the production of 'relative surplus-value', and capitalism itself, would become an impossibility" (Rosdolsky 1977: 290). Regulation's pegging of wages to labor productivity is related to the view that income distribution is the crucial variable in explaining cyclical fluctuations because it affects the level of demand in the economy. It also implies that for capital, the crucial element is the profit share in the product (Dumenil and Levy 1993: 237) . This is contested both empirically (Dumenil and Levy 1993) and theoretically. Regarding the latter, Shaikh (1992) , among others, has shown that the crucial variable is the profit rate, and the profit share is relevant only inasmuch as it affects the former.
Aglietta's neglect of necessary labor time 11 and the productive individual consumption distinction was facilitated by his notion of a consumer hegemony of the wage earner. This is evident in his later works, in which the fundamental characteristic of the wage society is the fact that "the wage-earner established its grip in the totality of economic movement by becoming the first client of production" (Aglietta and Brender 1984: 9) . But it already existed, in a state of hibernation, in the theory of the consumption norm. This is expressed in the definition of Fordism as the functional linkage of mass production and mass (wage earners') consumption, in which the latter represents the previously missing element. This assump-tion led in his later works to the incorporation of the wage earners' consumption to the capitalist project, as an essential, if not the essential, element. What constitutes the state of hibernation of the notion of consumer hegemony in the theory of the consumption norm is the fact that Aglietta was still holding to a value-theoretic and a class-theoretic (albeit under the misleading and erroneous version of the wage-earning class) framework. Therefore, consumption could not and had not been autonomized totally but only relatively from the relations of production (which are, by definition, social). To put it in terms of the semiotic terminology adopted by postmodernism and Aglietta, the sign is still linked to labor. It is in his recent works that consumption achieves its total autonomy. It is an interplay of signs linked to usages and to commodities but not linked to labor and governed mainly by behaviors and behavioral strategies.
The idea of some kind of consumer hegemony of the working class (or the wage earners) is problematic. Marx (1982: 718) has correctly argued that individual capitalists strive to reduce the workers' individual consumption to the necessary minimum. The maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital, but the capitalist may safely leave this to the workers' drives for self-preservation and propagation.
In this context, the individual consumption of workers and the necessary labor time for the reproduction of labor power are determined, apart from the rate of profit, the "natural" and historical requirements for the reproduction of labor power, by the class struggle between capital and labor, a struggle in which each side holds opposite objectives. However, for late Aglietta, this does not seem so. Fordism provided the instrument for this break, since the capitalist acquired an overwhelming interest in his workers' welfare. In the theory of the consumption norm, this is disguised under a rhetoric of class struggle. It is the class struggle, in the historical form of the revolutionary movements of the 1920s, that obliged capital to incorporate in its objectives the conditions of reproduction of its workforce. But this is more lip service than an essential point of view. For the regulationists, the main element that dictated these changes is the necessity for the expansion of the market for the products of Dept.II as a requirement for the harmonious development of the two departments. Aglietta's next step is to erase every trace of independent influence of the working class, to subordinate everything to capitalist objectives and norms. This is coupled with a liquidation of the working class into the vast mass of wage earners and finally its complete dissolution. Of course, conflicts and conflictual strategies do continue to exist, but now they represent internal and reconcilable contradictions. Consequently, necessary labor time becomes redundant, 12 since wage is no longer linked to the value of a bundle of commodities but is simply a sum of money.
Apart from the rejection of necessary labor time, the other constitutive element of the theory of the consumption norm is the status relations (or social relations of ideological nature). Here, the conceptions that led to Aglietta's subsequent postmodernist formulations are clear. Consumption behaviors are autonomized from the relations of production via ideology and the introduction of functional aesthetics (design) and status as determining ele-ments. The latter not only issue from but also create social stratification. Aglietta moves to meet postmodernism not in the nascent stage where class becomes an external referent but in the mature stage where class is also being dissolved into discourse. Discursive elements such as ideology assume explanatory primacy. The ill-defined "social relations of ideological nature" give their place to the determination of social relations by ideology. This is a position supported not only by postmodernists but also by a wide range of popular theories of sociology (see McCracken 1987: 147) . Consumption is the primary area of application of these considerations: "Part of the history of consumption, then, must consist in documenting the transformation of 'class' as an influence and then showing how new groups and influences began to affect the consumer" (McCracken 1987: 148) . The usual hypothesis is that while class was still the chief determinant during the Industrial Revolution, by the late nineteenth century, it started to lose its preeminence and was being displaced by status, lifestyles, culture, and so forth. Diffusion theories, opinion leadership models, and theories of conspicuous consumption and status competition are implemented to explain innovation, normalization, and diversification of consumption patterns. Therefore, consumption is paramount in defining and regulating social stratification and mobility. The sole difference of this approach with Aglietta is that the latter still retains a weak and vague priority of the economy. It is not a consumer society but a wage society in which the wage earner is not only a laborer but also a consumer. This formulation, on the other hand, meets the already mentioned problem of the theory of classes.
There are significant problems with the empirical side of regulation's argument. The alleged linkage of (real) wages to productivity increases, and the subsequent capital-labor accord, has been convincingly rejected in many studies (e.g., Brenner and Glick 1991: 93) . Brenner and Glick (1991: 82-83) showed there was no deficiency of working-class consumption in the 1920s: the wage share increased over the period , and real wages in the manufacturing sector also rose dramatically in the period from the end of World War I. Thus, Brenner and Glick (50, 54) criticize rightly the regulationist position on three counts. First, that there cannot be a form of capitalism in which absolute surplus value predominates. Second, they dispute the regulationist conception of a whole capitalist epoch (extensive RoA) during which capital accumulation takes place without significant increases in both the real wage and aggregate consumption. Third, they challenge regulation's argument that the lack of institutionally ensured levels of consumption (i.e., the Fordist social compromise) is a fetter to the scope and intensity of capitalist accumulation. Brenner and Glick argued, correctly, that where capitalist social-property relations are fully established, we can, all else being equal, expect to find: development on the basis of relative surplus-value; long-term capital accumulation bringing about rises in wages and aggregate consumption; and investment and cost-cutting technical change leading to, but not necessarily conditioned by, growth of the mass market. (54) Dumenil and Levy (1988: 4) have also offered an accurate critique of the regulationist scenario. Taking the period before World War I as the basis of comparison, they studied certain crucial regulationist hypotheses with respect to the United States and France. Regarding consumption, they tested the regulationist hypotheses that the post-World War II period was characterized by (1) a higher rate of growth of wages and (2) a higher share of consumption than in the 1920s and before World War I. 13 They concluded that although the French data confirm them, they fail utterly against the U.S. evidence. Especially with regard to the 1920s, none of the hypotheses concerning it are confirmed. On the other hand, the evidence produced by Dumenil and Levy denies the regulationist hypotheses not only for the interwar years but for the post-World War II era as well. Only one hypothesis (a higher rate of growth of wages) is confirmed unconditionally. The one about a higher share of consumption is rejected outright. Thus, they argue that there was no change in the level of working-class consumption from the pre-Fordism period of the 1920s to the Fordist era. Dumenil and Levy (1993: 236-39) have shown that in the case of the U.S. economy, the share of gross consumption in gross national product (GNP) was not exceptionally low. On the contrary, the share of consumption in GNP throughout the postwar boom was 20 percent lower than it had been during the supposedly underconsumptionist 1920s.
Following from the previous criticisms, regulation's interpretation of the Great Depression as an underconsumption crisis is disputable. The regulationist hypothesis of deficient demand for consumption goods, combined with increased supply in the 1920s, is not verified. Not only was there no inadequate consumer demand in the 1920s, but there is no evidence of an inadequate demand of capital goods from Dept.II. Moreover, as Brenner and Glick (1991: 80) pointed out, even if it were, why could it not be offset by demand for capital goods by firms seeking to remain competitive through technical innovation (which itself would increase employment and thus consumer demand)? After all, the growth of demand and consumption can generally increase faster through a rise in investment leading to the hiring of more workers than through an increase in wages per worker.
Is there a secular deficiency in accumulation in the department of means of consumption?
One of the basic pillars of regulation's theory of consumption is the misty dictum that the "motive impulses" in the transformation of the forces of production derive from Dept.I. This entails that there is a structurally inscribed possibility accumulation in the department producing means of consumption to lag behind that of the department producing means of production. Thus, each RoA, and the socioeconomic institutions of its accompanying MoR, has to devise a historically specific solution to this problem. Again, Aglietta (1979) offered the fuller account of this view with his "motive impulses" hypothesis. Mavroudeas (1992) argued in detail that this is an unsustainable thesis.
The hypothesis of the primacy of Dept.I is popular within the Marxist tradition, although it is neither a realistic assumption nor did Marx accept it. Luxemburg (1971) has suggested that Marx's schemes of reproduction implied that "accumulation in Department II is completely determined and dominated by accumulation in Department I" (127). Rosdolsky (1977: 448) and Robinson (1971: 19) have correctly pointed out that there is no reason why the impulse toward accumulation should come primarily from Dept.I and also that Marx had not so suggested. However, many of his critics also had resorted to some formula based on this belief (Bauer 1913; Bukharin 1972) . The basis of these errors is a misunderstanding of Marx's levels of abstraction. Whereas Marx's schemes of reproduction are based on the assumption of constant conditions of production and constant OCC, rate of surplus value, and rate of accumulation (hence, consciously abstracting from technical changes and increases in labor productivity), almost all the subsequent formulations presuppose the changeability of these conditions. However, when Marx's strict assumptions are relaxed, it is obvious, as Rosdolsky (1977: 495) argued, that the necessary condition for equilibrium in expanded reproduction does no longer hold.
Confronted with the theoretical grandeur and structural coherence of the contributions of those implicated in the debates around Marx's reproduction schemes, despite all their shortcomings, regulation shows a poor record. If older contributions misconceived the Marxian methodology and its levels of abstraction, Aglietta fails utterly. If his predecessors have ill-defined levels of abstraction, he is almost totally unable to distinguish and define these levels properly. It is, therefore, not clear at all at what level he constructs his theory of departments of production and their interrelationship. Obviously, it is not that highly abstract level of the Marxian schemes. Is it then the actual, concrete historical reality of capitalist development? His m-r method points to some middle-of-the-road methodological choice, the constitutive assumptions of which are not clear at all. Aglietta (1979: 60-61) introduces technical change, rise of the OCC, and relative surplus value and bases all these on the dominance of Dept.I over Dept.II. He argues that the contradictory development of capitalist relations of production preclude any general formal law of evolution of the rate of return, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF). Capitalist accumulation derives its impulse from the uneven development of Dept.I. But this uneven development meets a barrier in the course of accumulation. This barrier, which is always latent, can be raised only if capitalist production revolutionizes the conditions of existence of the wage-earning class. It is only by this social transformation that commodity production can achieve a rhythm of expansion that permits at least a tendential realization of that harmonious development of the two departments, which is a necessary condition for a regular rhythm of accumulation. Therefore, the whole historical epoch that has arisen since World War I represents a new stage in the development of capitalism.
Aglietta's understanding of Marx's theory of accumulation is at least cavalier. It is trivial to say that the Marxist theory of accumulation is a theory of the contradictory development of capitalist relations of production. However, it is not at all contrary to dialectics to formulate an analysis of the general tendency of the rate of profit, as Marx did with the TRPF theory. In addition, it has been shown that Marx does not assume that the uneven development of capitalism is based on the faster development of Dept.I (especially at the expense of Dept.II). Then, Aglietta constructs a model that claims to represent, at the same time and at the same level of abstraction, a general theory of both capitalist accumulation (with emphasis on equilibrium relations) and the actual historical evolution of capitalism. However, it is difficult to see how on this ground the hypothesis of the dominance of Dept.I over Dept.II can be justified. If this is not correct within the highly abstract and very strict framework of the Marxian schemes of reproduction, obviously it does not hold at all in concrete historical reality. The actual day-to-day workings of capitalism, even for the pre-Fordist periods, do not show any proof of subservience of the department producing means of consumption to that producing means of production nor a faster development of the former.
In fact, Aglietta advances a milder, but even more questionable and erroneous, version of Luxemburg's thesis: the motive impulses for the transformation of the productive forces derive from Dept.I. In other words, technical innovation takes place primarily and, for a long historical period, exclusively in Dept.I. This is an unsustainable hypothesis. As Brenner and Glick (1991: 62) also argued, Aglietta's pre-Fordist scheme pictures a very odd economy in which capitalists produce machines for other capitalists with little or no final outlet in consumer goods, an economy composed entirely of Dept.I, in which capitalists are figuratively eating one another's machine. Furthermore, it is illogical, and also historically inaccurate, that capitalists in Dept.II would refrain from employing cost-cutting innovations. Brenner and Glick (1991: 72-73) showed that the basis of U.S. industrialization was the capacity of the capital-goods sector to solve a series of roughly similar problems that had arisen in a wide range of consumer-goods industries. Thus, technical innovation in Dept.I took place mainly to facilitate production in consumer-goods industries, and this long before Fordism. After all, if the whole problem is (wrongly) discussed within the problematic framework of a reproduction scheme (as Aglietta does), then how can a general average rate of profit be achieved that would secure equilibrium relations?
However, Aglietta does not bother to justify his argument and treats it as self-evident. Mandel (1978) , who subscribed to a more flexible and qualified version of this hypothesis (namely, that although accumulation and technical change proceed faster in Dept.I in general, there are periodic variations of this pattern in favor of Dept.II and also capitalists in Dept.II will not abstain forever from innovating and employing relative surplus value extraction), is also wrong for the reasons mentioned above. The same reasons hold for the regulationist version and more forcefully since the latter does not allow even for Mandel's periodic variations in the rates of growth and the interrelationship of the two departments.
There are certain problematic assumptions behind the regulationist thesis. First, it seems that regulation identifies simplistically the transformation of the productive forces (changes in the organization of the labor process, technological innovation, etc.) with the production of new modernized means of production. However, technical innovation and relative surplus value can increase with the reorganization of the labor process, and the latter does not always require new machinery but rather a reconfiguration of previous technological systems. Path-breaking technological innovations are not always necessary for the revolutionization of the economic system. For example, in the nonnegligible case of the Industrial Revolution, few intellectual and technological refinements were necessary, and its technical inventions were extremely modest and build on already existing technical knowledge and appliances (Hobsbawm 1962: 30) .
Second, even technological innovation stemming from new machinery does not necessarily entail that this new machinery would be produced by Dept.I. Many of the industries that were instrumental for capitalism's birth and its first steps belonged to Dept.II, and many of the crucial technological changes thereafter originated in it. In the case of the Industrial Revolution, many technical innovations were invented and employed directly in Dept. II (see Hobsbawm 1962: chap. 2) . What made the difference was not the invention of new machines and their production by Dept.I, but the way previously existing technical inventions were reconfigured and applied in various sectors and industries and particularly in Dept.II.
Finally, the Industrial Revolution is again a testimony against the regulationist deficiency of accumulation in Dept.II for the whole pre-Fordist period. Hobsbawm (1962: 33) pointed out that in all countries that pioneered the Industrial Revolution, "the lead in indus-trial growth was taken by the manufacturers of goods of mass consumption-mainly, but not exclusively, textiles-because the mass market for such goods already existed."
Conclusions
Regulation's theorization of consumption is empirically unsound and analytically problematic. Both its analytical and empirical problems stigmatize its structure and derive largely from its methodology. Regulation, as a true m-r theory, attempts in an eclectic and contradictory manner to theorize both the general functions of capitalism and its specific historical evolution, but the basis for this analysis is the latter. This creates insurmountable problems because special characteristics of a period are either misinterpreted or wrongly acclaimed as general characteristics.
Beginning from the more fundamental premises of its theory of consumption, regulation proposes a superficial primacy of production over the other moments of the total circuit of capital (circulation-exchange-distribution). This primacy is not established as an inherent organic characteristic of the operation of the system but as a historical fact, which might work for one period but it might be reversed in another. Thus, Fordist mass consumption is supposed to be generated by the previously established mass production. However, in post-Fordism, the sequence is reversed, and it is argued that specialized market niches necessitate a post-Fordist production process. Thus, the initial primacy of production is easily reversed. This analytical volatility comes from regulation's middle-range methodological character. The result is an eclectic, methodologically unorganized, and empirically unsound theory that cannot grasp properly either production or consumption.
The founding idea of regulation's analysis of consumption (the alleged clear-cut distinction between the period that capital dominates production and the period that it dominates also the reproduction of labor power) is also schematic and cannot grasp accurately capitalism's historical evolution. In fact, capitalism dominates from its very beginning both production and consumption and transforms them both (to the extent that it is able) according to its needs. More specifically, working-class consumption (and thus the reproduction of labor power) was commodified from the very beginning of capitalism (not after World War II as regulation maintains) because this is a necessary condition for the creation of a class of wage laborers. From the very birth of capitalism, working-class consumption represented a market for capitalist commodities. This market was increasing, because both the size of the workforce and the real wage increased, although with irregularities and ups and downs. Furthermore, capitalist mass production was established long before the 1920s and mass consumption before the end of World War II. Thus, the regulationist interpretation of 1929 as an underconsumption crisis is simply wrong.
The other main pillars of regulation's theory of consumption are also theoretically and empirically problematic. Instead of a coherent theory of consumer tastes and preferences formation, regulation offers a jigsaw of versions in which economic and ideological and cultural relations mix incoherently. Thus, regulation moves cursorily from an initial covert equalization of the former with the latter to the open prioritization of ideological and cultural relations. In addition, the basis of all these processes ceases to be social classes, since the latter disappear in the latest regulationist versions. Its theory of wage determination, as a black box of struggles and institutional compromises without almost any structural constraint, fails dismally to understand the structural advantages enjoyed by the capitalist class. The alleged Fordist compromise (i.e., wages indexation to productivity) does not give either a proper theory of wage determination or an accurate interpretation of post-World War II capitalism. Finally, the more ambitious regulationist attempt to situate the sphere of consumption within the total circuit of capital (Aglietta's "motive impulses" thesis) is both theoretically and empirically invalid. As this article argued, there is no inherent structural subservience of Dept.II to Dept.I. Moreover, the integration of consumption with production cannot be theorized from within the premises of a reproduction scheme that focuses by definition on equilibrium relations and abstracts from complex processes of technological change and capital restructuring and, ultimately, instability tendencies.
To sum up, regulation, both generally and in the area of consumption theory, has attempted ambitiously to provide an analytical framework that could explain both the more abstract and the more concrete features of capitalism. However, its founding stylized facts and its theoretical and methodological assumptions and influences prevented regulation from succeeding in this task. The same task following the classical Marxian approach seems much more promising.
